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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is often used to explain the prevalence of debt as a means of
external financing. Early theories focused on frictions that arise after cash flows real-
ize, showing that debt minimizes the deadweight losses associated with monitoring and
verification when cash flows are only partially or costly observable.1 Subsequent work
derived the optimality of debt under ex-ante asymmetries of information.2 The idea is
that borrowers are often better informed than lenders about the distribution of future
cash flows, or that they need to exert effort to generate the cash flows. In either case,
the same two conditions are sufficient for debt to be optimal: (i) cash flows distributions
are hazard-rate ordered in the borrower’s quality, or in the degree of effort exerted; (ii)
securities’ payoffs are restricted to be monotonic functions of the realized cash flows, so
that performance-based bonuses or other non-monotonicities are assumed away.3
In this paper we explore when and why ruling out such bonuses is optimal, and
we derive necessary and sufficient conditions on fundamentals under which the optimal
securities are monotonic. Although we focus on adverse selection (that is, we build on
Nachman and Noe (1994)), similar insights extend to the moral hazard setting of Innes
(1990). When borrowers are better informed about the distribution of future cash flows
relative to their lenders, high quality borrowers can either credibly signal their type, or
they end up paying an information cost through the underpricing of the securities they
issue. Since better borrowers are less likely to generate low cash flows, this information
cost is minimized if the securities issued offer the greatest downside protection and the
lowest upside gain which secure that the lenders obtain their desired return.
It follows that non-monotonic contracts challenge the optimality of straight debt. This
occurs because, relative to debt, they increase the cash payed out to the lenders in low
states of the world, at the expense of the cash payed out to them in high states. Namely,
lenders who issued non-monotonic contracts have a greater downside protection and a
lower upside gain than lenders who issued straight debt. In the security design language,
1See the costly-state-verification models of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
2See especially Innes (1990, 1993), Nachman and Noe (1994) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999). These
models formalize intuitions already present in Myers and Majluf (1984).
3In a moral hazard setting, Hébert (2017) studies a model where effort moral hazard and risk shifting
are simultaneously present and shows that the optimal contract is always monotonic; Antic (2014), and
Lee and Rajan (2016) show that monotonic contracts are optimal when the principal is ambiguity averse.
In an adverse selection setting, Malenko and Tsoy (2018) show that the optimal contract is monotonic
when the principal is ambiguity averse.
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the payoff of such non-monotonic securities crosses the one of straight debt from the right,
reducing the mispricing of the securities issued by better quality borrowers.
So, what prevents such contracts from being used? The common explanation appeals
to window dressing possibilities. A (possibly discrete) performance-based bonus is paid
when the realized cash flows exceed some pre-specified benchmark. Now, suppose that a
borrower can window dress the cash flows - perhaps by secretly borrowing additional funds
from a friend.4 She clearly has an incentive to window dress when the realized cash flows
do not hit the benchmark, in order to cash the bonus. So, window dressing effectively
transforms debt with bonuses into straight debt, with ‘real’ (correctly anticipated) face
value equal to the contractual face value minus the bonus. The above story is sound if:
(i) window dressing possibilities are unbounded (e.g., the ‘friend’ has a deep pocket); and
(ii) borrowers may never be caught cheating. However, often some of these conditions
fail empirically.
In this paper, we generalize the results of Nachman and Noe (1994) to encompass such
cases. We characterize optimal securities and derive novel testable predictions relating the
size of bonuses to cross-sectional differences in asymmetric information and to the efficacy
of the legal system. In particular, we explicitly model window dressing by assuming that,
in the interim period, the borrower has access to a credit line from a ‘friend’. The credit
line enables her potentially to window dress earnings up to a fixed upper bound (with
respect to which we perform comparative static exercises), as well as to divert output. We
allow the window dressing and diversion bounds to depend on the realized cash flow and
we show that the optimal contracts is non-monotonic and it involves profit manipulation.
The key observation driving the results is as follows. Consider three possible realiza-
tions of the cash flows: $10, $20 and $30. Further, suppose that cash flows can be window
dressed up to $15, perhaps by secretly borrowing from a friend. An entrepreneur with a
realized cash flow of $10 can claim to have $20, but not $30. In contrast, an entrepreneur
with $20 can easily claim to have $30. Because the $10 type cannot pretend to be the $30
type, this example describes a situation known in the contracting literature as a failure
of the nested-range-condition, as defined in Green and Laffont (1986). This condition is
both necessary and sufficient for the revelation principle to hold – or, in our language,
for concentrating attention without loss of generality on contracts that prevent any profit
4Importantly, a secret third-party loan is just one of the many possible examples of window dressing,
which is a more general phenomenon. As it will be clear, our qualitative results do not depend on the
specific source of window dressing opportunities, but rather on their extent.
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manipulation on the equilibrium path.
The immediate and, in our opinion, important consequence of a failure of the nested-
range-condition is that contracts involving profit manipulation in equilibrium implement
allocations that cannot be achieved otherwise. In fact, we show that they strictly reduce
the mispricing of the securities issued by better borrower types for some (most) param-
eter values. We characterize two parameter regions where the uniquely optimal security
requires profit manipulation. In one region, the equilibrium is pooling and all borrowers
issue non-monotonic securities, such as debt with a strictly positive performance-based
bonus. In the other region, the equilibrium is separating and better borrowers issue non-
monotonic securities, whereas the worst borrowers can issue any other security, e.g. debt
or equity.
Furthermore, for sufficiently large window dressing possibilities the aforementioned
justification for monotonicity of securities holds, and every non-monotonic contract is ex
post equivalent to straight debt, with ‘real’ face value equal to the nominal face value
minus the bonus (as in Nachman and Noe (1994)). One contribution of our paper is to
explicitly characterize what ‘sufficiently large’ means analytically, i.e., to derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal. We also show that such conditions
are never satisfied if the distribution of future cash flows is unbounded above - this is
especially relevant for structural models, where often cash flows are assumed to be either
log-normally or exponentially distributed. Moreover, debt is never uniquely optimal:
there always exists a non-monotonic contract ex post equivalent to debt. We also provide
numerical examples to demonstrate that the region where debt contracts belong to the set
of optimal contracts is not only quite limited, but it also corresponds to the most extreme
degrees of manipulation opportunities and adverse selection. In this region, there always
exist optimal non-monotonic contracts that are ex post equivalent to debt.
Our model is explicitly designed to study the effect of window dressing on optimal
securities. However, window dressing is only one possible type of output manipulation, the
other being cash diversion. In the analysis, we allow for both window dressing and cash
diversion; our results cover both cases. The main insight obtained from cash diversion is
that it induces manipulation also with monotonic securities, which is not true for window
dressing. As a result, it constraints the set of firms that can be successful in raising
external financing.
One important question concerns the empirical implications of our exercise. Non-
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monotonic contracts are hard to observe in reality, and presumably this explains some
of the literature’s incentives to assume monotonicity in the first place. We would like
to point out that, although not as frequently as debt, non-monotonic contracts do exist,
especially in the context of managerial compensation.
Managerial compensation typically features performance-based bonuses, that may
often be discrete and sizable. These bonuses induce a non-monotonicity in outside in-
vestors’ compensation, and – consistent with our predictions – they introduce incentives
for the managers to manipulate earnings in order to cash the bonus. Our model provides
an equilibrium explanation of such manipulations, where they are priced out and used
optimally as a signaling device or to reduce mispricing. We predict that the lower the
extent of feasible manipulations and the smaller the distance across entrepreneurial types
in terms of net present values, the larger should be both the dispersion in bonuses across
entrepreneurs, as well as the informational content of the bonus. Indeed, larger bonuses
are granted to higher quality entrepreneurs in the separating region of the model.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
presents the baseline model. Section 4 introduces the relevant securities, and discusses
when and how they induce profit manipulation. Section 5 derives our main results. Sec-
tion 6 presents some parametric examples to streamline our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is closely related to the literature on security design under asymmetric infor-
mation. Myers and Majluf (1984) developed the ‘pecking order’ theory of debt optimality
under asymmetric information in a set up where only debt and (inside or outside) equity
contracts were allowed. Noe (1988) first showed that their theory required somewhat
restrictive assumptions on the distributions of earnings. Innes (1993) and Nachman and
Noe (1994) revisited the theoretical argument allowing for a broader set of contracts
than debt and equity. These papers found that to obtain debt as the optimal security
some monotonicity constraint has to be imposed both on the type space, and on the set
of feasible securities. The latter constraint restricts admissible contracts to those that
are ‘manipulation proof’. Since then, the monotonicity constraint has been widely used.
Prominent examples include DeMarzo and Duffie (1999); DeMarzo et al. (2005); Inderst
and Mueller (2006); Axelson (2007); Axelson et al. (2009); Gorbenko and Malenko (2011);
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Philippon and Skreta (2012); Scheuer (2013). Our contribution is to derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for monotonicity to be without loss of generality.
Furthermore, our paper is related to the literature on optimal contracting under profit
manipulation. The existing papers can be separated along two dimensions: (i) whether
manipulations are assumed to be bounded (and a function of types) or not; and (ii)
whether repayments can be extracted via additional tools such as verification, termination
or liquidation of the firm. A literature originating from Townsend (1979) and Gale
and Hellwig (1985) models unbounded manipulation with the possibility of verifying the
earnings at a cost (the so-called ‘costly state verification’ models). Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) and Hart and Moore (1998) study related models where verification is substituted
with the threats of termination and liquidation. In contrast, Green and Laffont (1986)
consider a set up with bounded manipulation possibilities but no verification. They
provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to hold – the
nested range condition – which fails naturally in financial contracting models where the
set of feasible manipulations is likely to be convex and depends on the type.
Lacker and Weinberg (1989) studied a model of ex post moral hazard where profit
manipulation opportunities move optimal contracts from debt toward equity-like arrange-
ments. Recent work that explicitly models profit manipulation opportunities includes
Picard (2000), Crocker and Slemrod (2007), Sun (2014), Guttman and Marinovic (2017)
and Strobl and Povel (2018). To our knowledge, previous papers did not allow for profit
manipulation within an adverse selection context, which is the focus of this paper.
3 The Economy
There are two dates {0, 1}, an entrepreneur and a competitive financier. Both agents are
risk-neutral and maximize date one consumption. The entrepreneur has a project that
generates stochastic date one earnings x ∈ X and requires a fixed input of I > 0 at date
zero. The financier has wealth W > I, and can either lend it to the entrepreneur or store
it without depreciation. The set of possible earnings realizations is X ≡ [0, K]. When
we allow for unbounded future earnings, we let K approach infinity. There are two types
of projects (entrepreneurs), t ∈ T ≡ {l, h}. Types differ according to their distribution
of earnings. The cumulative distribution function (cdf ) over X for a type t project is
Ft(x); its associated density is ft(x) > 0 for every x ∈ X. The project’s type is private
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information of the entrepreneur. Outside financiers only know that a fraction λl ∈ (0, 1)
are type l projects, and a fraction λh = (1 − λl) are type h projects. All projects have




x dFt(x) the full information expected value of a type t project. We assume
that all projects have positive net present value:
Assumption 1: Et[x] ≥ I > 0 for every t ∈ T .
5 (A1)
In addition, we make the following standard assumptions on the distributions of earnings:
Assumption 2: (A2)






> 0 for every x.
Continuity simplifies the analysis and it prevents contracts that penalize realizations
with strictly positive probability only for one type. Strict MLRP implies that Eh[x] >
El[x]. Both assumptions are standard in the literature (see for instance DeMarzo et al.
(2005)). The timing of the game is as follows:
• date 0: The entrepreneur of type t issues publicly a security (financial contract) de-
noted by s. Each financier simultaneously quotes a price P (s) at which he is willing
to buy the securities. If a contract is signed (securities are sold), the entrepreneur
collects P (s). Subsequent investment is observable and verifiable;
• date 1: Realized earnings x ∈ X are perfectly but privately observed by the
entrepreneur. She can costlessly manipulate reported earnings by secretly borrowing
from friends up to η̄(x) ≥ 0 or diverting η(x) ≤ x, and then report earnings
m ∈ M(x) ≡ [x−η(x), x+η̄(x)]. The possibility of manipulation and its magnitude
is common knowledge at date 0;
• date 2: Claims are settled based on borrower’s reported earning; the game ends.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2




5A1 guarantees that investment is risky, because I > 0 and strict positivity of ft(x) for every x imply
that Ft(I − ǫ) > 0 for all t ∈ T , for ǫ > 0.
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The novel ingredient that differentiates our findings from existing results is the pos-
sibility of ex post profit manipulation. We summarize the restrictions imposed on the
manipulation technology in the following assumption:
Assumption 3: The set of feasible manipulated earnings for given x ∈ X is: (A3a)
M(x) ≡ [x− η(x), x+ η(x)]
where η(x) and η(x) are C1 functions such that for every x: (i) η(x) ≤ x and η′(x) ∈ [0, 1);
(ii) η(x) ≤ K − x and η′(x) ≥ −1.
Condition η̄′(x) ≥ −1 guarantees that the higher the realized output, the higher the
output that can be reported. We allow for unbounded secret borrowing to nest Nachman
and Noe (1994) results as a special case of our framework. We assume that M(x) is a
convex set because if the entrepreneur can divert k dollars from the project to his own
accounts, we believe he should be able to divert also k − ǫ for every ǫ ∈ [0, k].
Since profit manipulation possibilities are the key innovation of our model relative to
the existing work, a few comments are due. First, we use the term window dressing to
denote any upward profit manipulation for two main reasons: first, to be in line with most
of the previous security design papers that refer to window dressing possibilities as the
main problem affecting non-monotonic security designs; second, and most importantly,
because our assumption is equivalent to a simple formal model of window dressing in the
literal sense, that is, a model of secret borrowing from friends. Indeed, we could think
about a third party who is directly related to the borrower (and so not subject to ex
post informational asymmetries) and who provides a short-term bridge financing at the
interim stage. The bounds on window dressing possibilities would naturally corresponds
to the depth of this friend’s pocket, hence such a model would be equivalent to ours.
In addition, although we believe that there is a potential risk of strategic default as
well as other issues in raising the necessary funds from a ‘friend’, in this model we assume
that all those impediments are absent for the following reason. The literature justifies
the monotonicity constrain due to the possibility of window dressing and concludes that
debt arises as the optimal contract under this assumption. We will claim that this is
not the case (as it is true only in some extreme cases). To clarify this point we make
this manipulation as easy as possible for the entrepreneur (subject to our manipulation
boundaries) and show that even in this hypothetical scenario manipulation does not
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eliminate non-monotonicity of the equilibrium contact. Surely, if one makes manipulation
even more difficult the monotonicity constraint is even harder to justify.
As for the possibility of output diversion, it is important to stress that none of our
qualitative results depend on it, so the reader who just wants to consider window dressing
can simply set η(x) = 0 from now on.6 Because of earnings misreporting, a security s(·)
cannot be a function of x as in the previous literature. Instead, it is a function of the
reported earnings m(x|s). Because M(x) is a compact set for every x ∈ X, we know that




Further, because M(x) ⊆ X, we know that m∗(x|s) ∈ X.7 Hence, the expected repay-
ment of a security (or its real payoff ) is a function s(m∗(x|s)) : X → R. It should be
noticed that the ex post verification problem created by the possibility of profit manip-
ulation prevents the application of the revelation principle, since M(x) does not need to
satisfy the nested-range-condition of Green and Laffont (1986).
The only restriction we impose on the contract space is that each security must satisfy
limited liability, as appropriately redefined in terms of messages:
Assumption 4: The set of admissible securities is given by: (A4)
S ≡ {s(m) | 0 ≤ s(m) ≤ m, ∀m ∈ X}.
If the borrower declares m and cannot repay s(m) to his financier, then the financier
becomes the legitimate owner of borrower’s assets.8
A possible interpretation of our limited liability assumption is that sending a message
is equivalent to the action of showing the balance on the firm’s account to the lenders,
after any eventual window dressing or cash diversion. In this case, payments can only be
6We could have modeled diversion as output destruction, in which case the entrepreneur could not
put the diverted amount in his pocket. However, in such a scenario the entrepreneur would be indifferent
between diverting and not in equilibrium, making such possibilities useless.
7Our formulation restricts attention to direct mechanisms where the set of messages is a subset of the
set of states X, following Green and Laffont (1986).
8Since the limited liability constraint must be defined in terms of messages rather than realized output,
we should consider the case in which the entrepreneur declares earnings that exceed true earnings, and
does not have the resources to repay the contractual obligation. In this case, the fraud becomes observable
and verifiable: it is revealed that he is either lying about x or refusing to make the payment he committed
to make. We implicitly assume that when the fraud is revealed the agent receives a large punishment.
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weakly smaller than the total cash shown to be available in the accounts, i.e. m.9
Denote by Vt the profits of an entrepreneur of type t whose offered security s has been
priced at P by the financier, and by Vf the financier’s profits. Then we can write:









− P (s). (2)
The expectation in (2) is given by the sum across types (weighted by the posterior be-















Notice that we can write m∗t (x|s) = m
∗(x|s) because the cost and benefits of output
manipulation ex post are not type-dependent.
Here we adopt the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies:





and a common posterior belief λ∗(t|s) for
t ∈ T form a pure strategy PBE of the game if the following conditions are satisfied:





2. For every t ∈ T , s∗t maximizes Vt(st, P
∗(st),m
∗) subject to the limited liability
constraint (st ∈ S);
3. The posterior belief λ∗(t|st) is obtained from Bayes’ Rule whenever possible;
4. Competitive Rationality: for st ∈ S, P
∗(st) = Eλ∗(t|st)[st]
As standard, a PBE is said to be separating if s∗h 6= s
∗
l , and pooling otherwise. Notice
that, because investment is observable and verifiable, in every equilibrium it must be
the case that either P ∗(st) = 0 (no investment), or P
∗(st) ≥ I (investment takes place).
To rule out ‘unreasonable’ equilibria, we refine the off-equilibrium-path beliefs using the
Intuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).10
9We thank the editor for having suggested this interpretation to us.
10The formal definition of the Intuitive Criterion is left to the Appendix.
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4 Debt and Bonus Contracts
It is useful to stress again the distinction that arises in this model (unlike the existing
literature) between the promised expected payoff and the real expected payoff of a security.
The promised expected payoff is given by Eλ∗(s)[s(m = x)], where each realized x is
assumed to be reported truthfully. In contrast, the real expected payoff is given by
Eλ∗(s)[s(m
∗(x|s))], where m∗(x|s) solves condition (1) of a PBE, i.e. it maximizes the
entrepreneur’s ex post payoff. The characteristic features of a debt contract are: (i) the
fixed repayment in non-bankruptcy states; and (ii) seniority in bankruptcy states. If we
denote the face value of debt by d, then whenever m ≥ d, the debt security specifies
s = d. If, instead, m < d, a bankruptcy state, the debt holder is a senior claimant on the
assets, obtaining repayment s(m) = m.
In order to characterize the real payoff of a standard debt contract, we need to intro-
duce some additional notation. In particular, consider a debt contract with a face value
d and suppose that K− η(K) > d. Define as δ(d) the highest threshold such that output
diversion is profitable for entrepreneurs, i.e.:
δ(d) ≡ max
x∈X
{x|x− η(x) < d}.
Such point exists and is unique by the intermediate value theorem due to continuity and
monotonicity of function x − η(x) (see Assumption 3) and the fact that K − η(K) > d
and −η(0) < d. If K − η(K) ≤ d, instead, then simply set δ(d) ≡ K.






x− η(x), if x ≤ δ(d),
x, otherwise.
The dashed curve in Figure 1 depicts the real payoff of a standard debt contract.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The contract that turns out to be generically optimal (we call it a bonus contract)
11





m, if m < b
d, otherwise.
(3)
A bonus contract can be decomposed in two parts: straight debt with face value b, and
a bonus of size b − d to be paid whenever the firm does not default on its debts. It is a
non-monotonic contract, and the reason for its optimality (as we shall prove) lies in the
fact that it crosses the payoff of straight debt from the right. In other words, it provides
greater downside protection and lower upside gain to the outside lenders.




.11 Moreover, if d = 0 the bonus contract becomes an asset-or-nothing binary
option (or, equivalently, debt with a strictly positive performance-based bonus). Figure
2 depicts the promised payoff of contracts as defined in (3).
Insert Figure 2 about here
We next characterize the optimal amount of secret borrowing under bonus contracts.
To do so we need to introduce a final piece of notation. Define a function η̄(x) ≡ x+ η̄(x).
This function is continuous and strictly increasing on [0, K]. Consider a bonus contract
(b, d) such that η̄(0) < b. Given that η̄(b) ≥ b by definition, the intermediate value
theorem implies that there exists β(b) ∈ (0, b] such that η̄(β(b)) = β(b) + η̄(β(b)) = b.
Monotonicity of the function η̄(x) ensures the uniqueness of such a point. This defines
a strictly monotonic function12 on the interval (η̄(0), K). We extend this function on
[0, d] by setting β(b) = 0 for any b ∈ [0, η̄(0)]. For a given b, the value β(b) specifies the
smallest realized earnings so that the entrepreneur can reach the cut-off point b by means
of secret borrowing. Consider a bonus contract (b, d) such that η̄(0) < b.
Lemma 1. (The Real Payoff of a Bonus Contract) Given any bonus contract s
with fixed repayment d and threshold b, we have two cases:
11Standard debt contracts are special cases of (3) where d = b. For this reason we shall always make
explicit whether the contracts we discuss must feature a strictly positive bonus or not.
12It followed from the implicit function theorem and Assumption 3.
12





x− η(x), if x < max{β(b), δ(d)},
b, if x ∈ [max{β(b), δ(d)}, b),
x, otherwise.
2. If b − d ≤ η(b), then the real payoff of a bonus contract is equivalent to that of a
debt contract with face value d.
As a result, a bonus contract is ex post non-monotonic if and only if β(b) > δ(d).
Proof. See the Appendix
Figure 3 depicts the real payoff of a bonus contract for the cases of two different levels
of profit manipulation. In Panel A of Figure 3, β(b) > δ(d) and the real payoff is not ex
post monotonic. In Panels B and C of Figure 3, β(b) < δ(d) and the real payoff is ex
post equivalent to that of a debt contract with face value d.
Insert Figure 3 about here
5 Optimal Security Design
In this section we solve for the optimal securities. We first consider the case in which the
separation can be achieved and then turn attention to pooling equilibria.
5.1 Separating Equilibria
In this section we characterize the set of Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (SPBE).
Such equilibria never arise with the exogenous monotonicity constraint (Nachman and
Noe, 1994). The intuition behind the SPBE is the following: the most productive type
tries to distinguish himself from the less productive one by offering securities with high
downside protection and low upside payoff for the financier (e.g., bonus contracts). By
doing so, high types impose a relatively higher cost on low types should they try to mimic.
Of course, separation can only be achieved if El[x− η(x)] ≥ I. From now on, we assume
that this inequality holds.
In a SPBE, sl 6= sh. Moreover, given the offered security st, the posterior belief that




∗(x|s))] ≥ Et[x− st′ 6=t(m
∗(x|s))],
or, equivalently: Et[st(m
∗(x|s))] ≤ Et[st′ 6=t(m
∗(x|s))]. Further, at any SPBE it must be
that Et[st(m




Finally, it is trivial to show that the only incentive constraint that may be binding is that
for the l type not to mimic the h type, i.e:
Eh[sh(m
∗(x|s))]− El[sh(m
∗(x|s))] ≤ 0. (4)
This formulation of the incentive constraint allows us to proceed and solve for the optimal
contract as it will become clear below.
Suppose that sh is a bonus contract (bh, dh). After some algebraic manipulation which




































Recall that β(bh) is defined as the threshold such that for every x ≤ β(bh) diversion is
weakly preferred to window dressing. Hence, inequality (5) highlights the key mechanism
that underlies separation: setting a threshold bh that makes β(bh) high enough so that
the last bracket becomes not just negative, but low enough that the second line counter-
balances the first. The key properties of (5) that are useful in the analysis are given in
Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. (Incentive Compatibility) If ∃ bh ∈ [0, K] that satisfies (5), then:
1. There is a unique bh at which the inequality (5) binds. We denote it by b
1;
2. For every bh < b
1 the inequality (5) is violated, and separation fails;
3. For every bh ≥ b
1 the inequality (5) is satisfied, and separation succeeds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The argument to prove Lemma 2 is not immediate, as inequality (5) is a non-monotonic
function of bh. The proof relies on the fact that if the inequality is satisfied for some
bh < K, one can show that the set of bh such that the inequality is binding is a singleton,
and the inequality is always satisfied for values bh ≥ b
1, and never otherwise. If (5) is
satisfied, then a contract is incentive compatible and leaves the financier at his participa-
tion constraint. However, it remains to guarantee that the underlying contract belongs
to the set of admissible securities, i.e. that dh ≥ 0.
Denote by βmax the solution to the zero profit condition in a SPBE for type h when
the face value of debt dh = 0, and by b
max the corresponding contractual threshold such






fh(x)dx = I. (6)
We obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (SPBE) If b1 exists and b1 ≤ bmax then:
a. there exists a separating equilibrium e∗s in which a type h entrepreneur issues a
bonus contract (b∗h, d
∗




and β(b∗h) > δ(d
∗
h);
b. type l entrepreneurs are indifferent between any contract such that El(s) = I, as
long as it is not a bonus contract with d∗l ≤ d
∗
h;
c. no pooling equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, when b1 ≤ bmax separation may be achieved because MLRP implies that the
low type (t = l) expects to repay more relative to the high type. Thus, by choosing
a sufficiently high threshold for the bonus contract (and a sufficiently low face value of
debt) the high type can make the cost of mimicking for the low type excessively high, and
credibly signal his type to the uninformed financiers. Separation requires that the contract
issued by the high type is ex post non-monotonic, otherwise the analysis in Nachman and
Noe (1994) goes through. So, a necessary condition for separation is β(b) > δ(d), which
guarantees that the bonus contract is ex post non-monotonic (see Lemma 1).
It should be stressed that this equilibrium is not unique in terms of the securities
used for achieving it. However, the equilibrium allocation is unique in the sense that
in any of the separating equilibria the securities issued are fairly priced. Thus, in any
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separating equilibrium each type of entrepreneur get the net present value of his project.
The multiplicity of separating equilibria is the feature of all models where the signal does
not imply the deadweight loss (non-dissipative signals, see Bhattacharya (1980)).
Nevertheless, our choice of focusing on bonus contracts still needs to be justified. Does
a separating equilibrium exist outside the region covered by Theorem 1? And if so, what
contracts support it? The answers to these questions are negative: if separation is not
implementable through bonus contracts, then credible signaling cannot happen under any
other security that satisfies limited liability. This occurs because under a bonus contract
the full reported earnings are transferred to the financier if they lie between zero and
the threshold b. Because the probability that the low type reports earnings below b is
higher, the bonus contract maximizes the cost of mimicking for the l type. Given limited
liability, no other contract can achieve a higher expected repayment for the low type in
this region. In other words, the conditions in Theorem 1 are both necessary and sufficient
for separating equilibria to exist:
Corollary 1. (Necessity of bonus contracts for separation) If b1 does not exist
or b1 > bmax, then any PBE of the game must be pooling.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows: a higher threshold for the bonus contract (and
a lower face value of debt) increases the cost of mimicking for the low type. This cost
is maximized when dh = 0 and the threshold is b
max. If the distributions are such that
the incentive constraint for the low type is violated at this contract, then separation is
impossible and every equilibrium must be pooling. The argument is sometimes referred
to in the literature as showing that ‘no security in S crosses the repayment function of a
bonus contract from the left’. We characterize the pooling equilibria next.
5.2 Pooling Equilibria
Since Nachman and Noe (1994) seminal paper, the literature has adopted a stronger
refinement than the intuitive criterion to deal with pooling equilibria: the D1 criterion.
As is well known, the intuitive criterion does not bind in the pooling region of such models.
The reason is that both types may benefit from any deviation depending on the posterior
belief of the financier. D1 refines the equilibrium set and obtain a unique equilibrium
because it is a condition on the range of beliefs for which a deviation is profitable.
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The zero-profit condition for a bonus contract (b, 0) is:














Theorem 2. (PPBE, part (a)) If b1 > bmax (or b1 does not exist) and there exists
bλ ∈ (0, K] solving (7), then there is a unique pooling equilibrium e
∗
p which satisfies D1.
At e∗p, all types issue a bonus contract with zero face value of debt (bλ, 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 2 characterizes the set of equilibria that satisfy D1 when separation is not
feasible (b1 > bmax), but the manipulation possibilities are relatively low (bλ < K). In
this region, the uniquely optimal contract is a bonus contract with zero face value of debt.
The intuition for the result is similar to that of Theorem 1: bonus contracts minimize
the mispricing of securities issued, even though they do not reduce it to zero.
To conclude the characterization, define the zero-profit condition for a debt contract
with face value d (when window dressing opportunities are shut down due to monotonicity


























The following result holds:
Theorem 3. (PPBE, part (b)) If the solution bλ of (7) satisfies bλ > K and
ZP−(K) ≥ 0 then there is a unique pooling equilibrium e∗p satisfying D1, at which all




p > 0. If ZP
−(K) < 0 then there is no
financing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Unlike the previous cases, where debt has been shown to be suboptimal, the result in
Theorem 3 allows debt contracts to arise in equilibrium, since d∗p > 0. To be precise: A
necessary and sufficient condition for debt to be optional under output diversion is:
Corollary 2. (Optimality of straight debt) Suppose that bλ > K and ZP
−(K) ≥
0. Then the optimal contract (b∗p, d
∗




p), which implies that any bonus contract that satisfies the pooling zero profit
condition is ex post monotonic (see Lemma 1).
The Corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3 and Lemma 1. Importantly, debt is
never uniquely optimal because its payoff can always be replicated by a bonus contract
with a higher threshold and identical face value d∗p.
Finally, observe that both Theorem 3 and its corollary rely on the distribution of
earnings being bounded above. For this reason, whenever the earnings distribution is not
bounded above they describe empty sets. Such result would hold, for instance, whenever
earnings belong to the normal or exponential family.
Theorem 4. (Unbounded support) If the distribution of earnings is unbounded
above, i.e. K → ∞, then straight debt is suboptimal regardless of parameter values.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this section we characterized the set of equilibria of the model. Bonus contracts are
always optimal, and they provide necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the
unique equilibrium allocation of the game. Debt contracts only arise as a corner solution,
when limited liability is binding and the earnings distribution is bounded above.
6 Examples
We now show how our results translate both for some families of widely used distributions
that satisfy A2: the exponential, normal and log-normal distribution. We also present
the case of the distribution with linear density function. The probability distribution










with µt=l > 0 and µt=l < µt=h. This family satisfies strict MLRP, because for any









(K(2 + µt′)− 2x)2(1 + µt)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[µt − µt′ ]
and µt′ < µt whenever t
′ < t. We solve for optimal contracts for a range of parameter
values and for two cases: when output diversion is forbidden and when it is allowed
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along with window dressing. In this exercise we demonstrate under which parameters
we observe separating vs. pooling equilibria as well as equilibria with monotonic vs.
non-monotonic contracts. Since debt can only arise only in cases of distributions with
bounded support we consider truncated versions of the above mentioned distribution
families. The examples are solved under the assumption that (i) η(x) = 0 and η(x) = η
for every x, for η ∈ [0, 10] for the case of window dressing only and (ii) η(x) = η(x) = η
for every x, for η ∈ [0, 4] for the case of window dressing and output diversion.13 Table
1 summarizes the parameter values that we assume.14
Insert Table 1 about here
Figures 4 and 5 shows the characterization of equilibria for the examples. The black
region is where a separating equilibrium exists (and it is unique, in terms of allocations).
The gray regions are where a pooling equilibrium exists, and it is unique. Dark gray
area corresponds to pooling equilibrium with non-monotonic contract, while light gray
area represents cases with debt being the unique pooling equilibrium contract. Finally,
the white region is where no financing occurs. Figure 4 corresponds to the case when
entrepreneurs can engage only in window dressing and Figure 5 draws types of equilib-
ria when both window dressing and output diversion are allowed.show that the regions
described in Theorems 1 and 2 are non-empty.
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the optimal financial contract under ex ante asymmetric informa-
tion, limited liability and ex post profit manipulation (window dressing) has the fol-
lowing features: (i) it is non-monotonic in earnings; (ii) it exhibits profit manipulation
on-the-equilibrium path. That is, the standard justification for restricting attention to
monotonic, manipulation-proof securities is not sound. The results suggest that ex ante
asymmetric information is not sufficient to theoretically justify the optimality and the
widespread use of debt contracts. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for mono-
tonic securities to arise in equilibrium. Monotonic securities are never uniquely optimal,
13More precisely, at the boundaries of the set X we assume that: (i) whenever x−η < 0, then η(x) = x;
and (ii) whenever x+ η > K, then η(x) = K − x.
14The examples include all projects such that $1 ≈ I ≤ El(x) < Eh(x) ≈ $4.
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and they may prevail only if both earnings are bounded, and feasibility is binding. Our
model should be of interest in at least two empirical contexts: CEO compensation, where
the presence of stock options and other performance-related bonuses is widespread, and
venture capital, where valuation-based milestones might induce non-monotonicities in the
payoff of both the investors and the firm’s managers/owners.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: The real payoff of debt
This figure depicts real (dashed line) and promised (solid line) payoffs of a standard debt
contract. The promised payoff is based on the realized output while the promised payoff is








Figure 2: The promised payoff of a bonus contract








Figure 3: The real payoff of a bonus contract
This figure depicts real (dashed line) and promised (solid line) payoffs of a bonus contract for the
cases of two different levels of profit manipulation. The promised payoff is based on the realized
output while the promised payoff is based on the declared output. In Panel A, β(b) > δ(d) and
the real payoff is not ex post monotonic. In Panels B and C, β(b) < δ(d) and the real payoff is























Figure 4: Numerical example: Equilibria types under window dressing only
This figure shows the characterization of equilibria for different distributions of the output. The
black region corresponds to parameters values where a unique separating equilibrium exists.
Recall that separation can only be implemented by means of non-monotonic contracts. The
dark gray region is where a unique pooling equilibrium in bonus contracts exists, and it is
unique. The light gray area corresponds to monotonic (debt contract) pooling equilibrium.
Finally, the white region is where no financing occurs. Four panels corresponds to four different




Figure 5: Numerical example: Equilibria types under window dressing and output
diversion
This figure shows the characterization of equilibria for different distributions of the output. The
black region corresponds to parameters values where a unique separating equilibrium exists.
Recall that separation can only be implemented by means of non-monotonic contracts. The
dark gray region is where a unique pooling equilibrium in bonus contracts exists, and it is
unique. The light gray area corresponds to monotonic (debt contract) pooling equilibrium.
Finally, the white region is where no financing occurs. Four panels corresponds to four different




Table 1: Parameter Assumptions
This table summarizes the parameter values for a set of statistical distributions that are used
for the numerical calculation of equilibria. The examples are solved under the assumption
that η(x) = η(x) = η for every x, for η ∈ [0, 4]. Examples include exponential (truncated),
normal (truncated), lognormal (truncated) distributions and a distribution with linear density
function. Notation: erf denotes the error function, whereas erfc denotes the complementary
error function.





0, x < 0,
1−e−x/t
1−e−K/t , x ∈ [0, K],
1, x > K
Truncated K = $10 tl ∈ [1, 4)
















, x ∈ [0, K],
1, x > K
Truncated K = $10 tl ∈ [1, 4)












, x ∈ [0, K],
1, x > K
Truncated K = $10 tl ∈ [1, 4)






0, x < 0,
K(2+t)x−x2
K2(1+t)
, x ∈ [0, K],
1, x > K
K = $10 tl ∈ [1, 4)







∗) the expected utility of type t entrepreneur issuing s∗t at the
equilibrium e∗, and by Π∗(s|T ) the set of all possible PBEs of the game played by
financiers given an observed s ∈ S15. We say that:
A PBE is does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if there exist an out-of-equilibrium
security s′ ∈ S such that only a subset of types τ ⊂ T may benefit from deviating to s′.















In words, suppose there are two types. Consider a pooling equilibrium, and a deviant
security that could only benefit the high type (if accepted) compared to the equilibrium
contract, for some off-equilibrium beliefs. The Intuitive Criterion prevents equilibria that
are sustained by the off-equilibrium belief that such a security would be offered by a low
type with positive probability. The next section introduces the key properties of the two
contracts which are relevant in this framework: debt and bonus contracts.
D1 refinement
Denote by V ′t the utility of type t entrepreneur at the deviant contract, and by V
∗
t the
utility of type t entrepreneur at the equilibrium contract. Moreover, denote by D(t|s′)
the set of responses of the financier that would deliver strictly higher utility to type t
entrepreneurs than the utility he would obtain at the equilibrium contract. Formally:
D(t|s′) ≡ {P ∗(s′) ≥ I : V ′t > V
∗
t }
where by competitive rationality, P ∗(s′) = Eλ∗(s′)[s
′] for all λ∗(s′) ∈ ∆T , as beliefs off-
the-equilibrium path are arbitrary. Finally, define the indifference set D0(t|s′):
D0(t|s′) ≡ {P ∗(s′) ≥ I : V ′t = V
∗
t }.
15Each element of the set can be parameterized by a posterior belief λ(s) ∈ ∆T , where we adopt the
convention that bold symbols represent vectors.
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The D1 restriction can be defined as follows16:






0, if ∃ t′ ∈ T s.t. t′ 6= t, and D(t|s′) ∪D0(t|s′) ⊂ D(t′|s′),
1, if D(t′|s′) ∪D0(t′|s′) ⊂ D(t|s′), ∀t′ 6= t ∈ T,
1− λt′ 6=t, otherwise.
Derivation of the Incentive Constraint – Inequality (5)

























Notice that if max{δ(dh), β(bh)} = δ(dh), the incentive constraint can never be satisfied
because the real payoff of the bonus contract is monotonic. Hence, for the rest of this
section suppose that max{δ(dh), β(bh)} = β(bh). This condition imply that β(bh) −
η(bh) ≥ dh, which together with the fact that β(bh) = bh−η̄(β(bh)) lead to bh−dh > η(bh).




















dh ≤ 0. (10)






























16The D1 restriction is stronger than the intuitive criterion, hence Theorem 1 goes through unchanged
if D1 is imposed.
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Proof of Lemma 1
1. Suppose that b− d > η(b) and β(b) ≤ δ(d). In this case, for any x < δ(d) it is not
optimal to window dress as the entrepreneur is better off with output diversion. For any
x ∈ [δ(d), b) we have that η̄(x) ≥ η̄(β(b)) ≥ b and therefore the entrepreneur can report
b which makes him better off than diverting the output. Finally, for any x > b neither
output diversion nor windows dressing benefits the entrepreneur and he truthfully reports
x.
Suppose now that β(b) > δ(d). In this case the entrepreneur diverts output for any
x < β(b) since it is impossible to reach the bonus region {x : x ≥ b} by means of window
dressing. For any x ∈ [β(b), b) window dressing is beneficial since d = δ(d) − η(δ(d)) <
x− η(x). Finally, for any x > b, as above, the entrepreneur truthfully reports x.
2. Assume now that b− d ≤ η(b). Note that in this case δ(d) > b. For any x < δ(d)
it is not optimal to window dress as the entrepreneur is better off with output diversion.
For any x > δ(d) > b the entrepreneur truthfully reports x. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From the definition of b1 we know that, if b1 exists, it must generate a threshold



























I − β1 + η(β1)
]
= 0.
The proof consists on showing that the derivative of the incentive constraint with
respect to β(bh) evaluated at β
1 is strictly negative.
To simplify notations in this section, we denote βh = β(bh). Differentiating the
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<0 because MLRP implies HRO
< 0.
The fraction is strictly positive whenever β1 > 0, which is clearly satisfied at every
contract that implements investment. The second bracket is negative because we assumed
strict MLRP, and it is well known that strict MLRP implies the strict HRO - hazard rate
ordering - which in turns guarantees that the bracket is strictly negative.
An immediate consequence of the strict inequality is that if the incentive constraint
crosses zero, it must do so only once. Lemma 2 follows. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Claims a and b: The claims follow from Lemma 2, definition of b1 and bmax
and the fact that if type l entrepreneur issues a bonus contract with d∗l ≤ d
∗
h that breaks
even on his type, the h type would mimic him and the financier would end up with a rate
of repayment lower than I. If β(b∗h) ≤ δ(d
∗
h), the incentive compatibility constraints are
violated because the contract is ex-post monotonic (see the discussion preceding Lemma
2).
Claim c: Suppose that all agents are in the pooling equilibrium ê of the game. Type
h (the better type) is certainly paying a strictly positive net rate of return to the investors,
therefore she would prefer to separate if possible. Type l would prefer to pool, but she
still prefers to separate than to mimic type h and issue the non-monotonic contract that
satisfies (5). Hence, whenever the non-monotonic contract is observed by the lenders
off-equilibrium, the Intuitive Criterion implies that they must believe that the deviation
comes from type h with probability one. If this is so, the deviation is profitable and the
pooling equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. To establish this result, some preliminary steps are required.
Denote the bonus contract with bh = b
max and dh = 0 as s
∗, and compare it with
another generic security s such that Eh[s
∗] = Eh[s] = I. Define the following sets:
Π+(s) ≡ {m|s
∗(m = x) > s(m = x)}
Π−(s) ≡ {m|s
∗(m = x) < s(m = x)}
Lemma 3. For every pair (ml = xl,mh = xh) in X
2 such that ml ∈ Π+ and mh ∈ Π−
we have mh > ml. Moreover, m
∗(xl|s
∗) ≥ m∗(xl|s) and m
∗(xh|s
∗) ≤ m∗(xh|s).
Proof. First notice that Π+(s) = ∅ if and only if Π−(s) = ∅, because ft(x) > 0 for
every x ∈ [0, K], for every t ∈ T . In this case the lemma is not very useful, but it is still
satisfied. Suppose Π+(s) is non-empty. Because of limited liability, it must be the case
that mh > b
max for every mh ∈ Π−, and ml < b
max for every ml ∈ Π+(s). As for the
claim about the real payoff, it follows directly from the shape of s∗. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. Denote the bonus contract with bh = b
max and dh = 0 as s
∗. For any
generic security s such that Eh[s
∗] = Eh[s] = I, we have that El[s
∗] > El[s].
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Proof. The only interesting case is, again, when Π+(s) is non-empty (else the lemma
holds trivially). Suppose so. Furthermore, suppose we move from s∗ toward s through
a series of steps such that in each step we create a security s′ such that Eh[s
′] = I, but
there exists a small interval dxa ∈ Π+(s) such that s
′(m∗(dxa)) < s
∗(m∗(dxa)) and this
change is compensated by inducing a change in the real payoff for another small interval































< 0 by MLRP
ft(xb) > 0,
where the second equality comes from Eh[s
∗] = Eh[s
′]. The iteration of this procedure
one step at a time concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Because of Lemma 4 we know that Eh[s
∗]− El[s
∗] < Eh[s]− El[s], for every Eh[s
∗] =
Eh[s] = I. The Corollary follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Existence: Suppose there exists an bλ that satisfies the pooling zero profit
condition. Define the security sp so that: dp = 0 and bλ solves the pooling zero profit
condition. Moreover, suppose that the market posterior is equal to the prior at sp, and
it is λh = 0 at any other s
′ 6= sp such that s
′ ∈ S. Then, all types issuing sp is an
equilibrium. It remains to show that it satisfies D1. In particular, we need to prove that
D(1|s′) ∪D0(1|s′) 6⊂ D(2|s′) for every s′ 6= sp such that s
′ ∈ S. There are two cases:
1. If El[s
′] < El[sp], then D(1|s
′) = [I,∞). Hence D(2|s′) ⊆ D(1|s′) ∪D0(1|s′);
2. If El[s
′] ≥ El[sp], Lemma 4 implies Eh[s
′] ≥ Eh[sp] as well. But we can say more:
Suppose we move from sp to s
′ through a series of consecutive steps (i.e. interim
contracts s′′) such that in each step we induce an increase in the real payoff of sp
by raising s′′(mk = xk) for some xk ∈ X. Clearly, it must be that xk ≥ bλ. Notice
that because sp is a pooling equilibrium, it must be that it does not satisfy (5).
Hence, because of MLRP, at xk we must have fl(xk) < fh(xk) - i.e. xk must exceed
17In both cases, construct the interval such that it is of equal length as the pdf centered at the two
points: f(xa), f(xb)
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the (unique) crossing point of the two densities. Therefore:
El[s












Iterating the same logic we conclude that Eh[s
′]−Eh[sp] > El[s
′]−El[sp]. It follows
that at e∗p it must be the case that, for all P
∗ ≥ I:
(





















which implies that D(2|s′) ⊆ D(1|s′) ∪D0(1|s′) again.
Uniqueness: From Corollary 1 we know that there can only exist other pooling
equilibria if the conditions required for Theorem 1 to apply do not hold. We now show that
if there exists an bλ ∈ (b
max, K) such that (7) is satisfied, then every pooling equilibrium
e′ of the game such that e′ 6= e∗p does not satisfy D1.
Consider a generic e′ 6= e∗p. The above analysis and Lemma 4 imply that there exists
s′ such that El[s
′] ≥ El[sp] but Eh[s
′] < Eh[sp]. Then the logic of the previous proof (point
2 above) is reversed. We conclude that such a equilibrium does not satisfy D1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. This theorem can be proved in the same fashion as Theorem 2, with a twist:
now it must be the case that a bonus contract with d = 0 cannot satisfy the pooling zero
profit condition. Hence, we start by finding the minimum d > 0 such that the condition
can be satisfied. Then, the result follows from the logic of the previous proof.




p > 0 we are hitting the upper bound
of the distribution of earnings. If ZP−(K) < 0 then such contract does not exist because
of high degree of output diversion so that even issuing a debt contract with face value
K does not satisfy the zero-profit condition. Hence, any other security could not break
even for the financier. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. When K → ∞ there always exists bmax such that the pooling zero profit
condition is satisfied for dp = 0, because ft(x) > 0 for every x ∈ X and t ∈ T . Moreover,
regardless of the extent profit manipulation, as long as it is bounded, the pooling contract
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with dp = 0 has a real payoff which is non-monotonic. As a result, any contract with a
monotonic real payoff cannot be part of an equilibrium that satisfies D1. Q.E.D.
36
